The Franchises of Telephone and Telegraph Companies, Legislative, Municipal and Congressional by Hamilton, G. C.




Primary amongst the questions confronting jurists and
legislators of to-day is that concerning the granting of
franchises to those creations of the law which ove their
inception to the progress of modem scientific invention-
telephone and telegraph companies. Although, in a measure,
novel in their uses, but few new legal questions have arisen
because of their existence, none to the adjudication of which
well-settled legal principles have not been sufficient. Very
little special legislation, on their behalf, has been enacted,
or indeed required. That which has found its way into the
statute books of the communities in which such electrical
corporations exist has been enacted largely with a view to
afford facilities for the better operation of scientific improve-
ments, which are, in their very nature, of inestimable value
to the general public. The residue of special enactments of
this kind have been found necessary to restrain such corpora-
tions from exercising powers that are not essential to their
existence and which have proved detrimental to already
existing and well-recognized rights.
The granting of franchises is a power that, unfortunately,
has not always been exercised with proper caution, though a
rigid conservatism in this respect, tending as it would to
nullify and defeat the rapid strides of scientific invention
and improvement, would undoubtedly prove deplorable, if
not actually disastrous. A franchise being "a branch of the
sovereign prerogative subsisting in the subject by a grant
from the sovereign,"' the delegation of such power should
be primarily beneficial to the sovereign public, then, to the
grantee. Shaw, C. J.,2 well defines the extent of legislative
13 B!. Com. 37; Finch, 164; 3 Cruise Dig. tit. 27, par. i.
'B. & L. R. R. v. Salem & L. R R., 2 Gray, 32.
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power in this respect; he says: "In addition to the law-
making power, the legislature is the representative of the
whole people, with authority to control and regulate public
property and public rights, to grant lands and franchises, to
stipulate for, purchase and obtain all such -property, privi-
leges, easements-and improvements as may be necessary ot
useful to the public, to bind the community by their contracts
therefor, and generally to regulate all public rights and
interests."
Of greatest moment, in regard to the franchises of tele-
phone and telegraph companies, is their use of the streets,
their existence upon the highways. Under the old English
common law, the easement in a highway was the property
of the king as universal trustee ;3 it consequently, under oui
form of government, becomes the property of the people,
unless otherwise stipulated, may be disposed of by their
representatives, and is subject to the absolute control of the
legislature. The regulation of the streets is ordinarily given
to a municipal corporation for corporate purposes only and
is even then subject to the paramount control of the legisla-
ture as regards general and more extended uses.4 The tech-
nical fee to the land may remain where it will, either in the
adjacent owner or in the public, for as long as the land is
preserved as a common highway, the rights of the technical
owner are subrogated to the easement to such an extent as
to practically cease to exist.5 To divest itself of the control
of the streets, and to vest a municipality with power to grant
particular franchises, that in any manner affect the common
easement enjoyed by the public, special action by the legis-
lature is necessary and the municipality must be so empow-
ered, expressly, or by direct implication.6
The legislative power to grant franchises is, in general,
absolute, for, except when prohibited or restricted by the
provisions of the state constitution, the legislature is fully
empowered to grant all franchises, even if they be exclusive,
Ix Rolle Abr. 392; Goodtitle v. Alker, i Burr. 143.
'Phila. & Trenton R. R., 6 Whart. 25.
Sullivan v. R. R. Co., 51 N. J. L. 518; Improvement Co. v. Hoboken,
36 N. J. L., 54o; R. R. Co. v. Newark, io N. J. Eq. 352.
'Phila. & Trenton R. R. v. Hoboken, 35 N. J. L. 2o8.
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within its own jurisdiction.7 For a municipal corporation
to grant exclusive franchises over the streets, it must possess
the whole sovereign power and control of the highways,
delegated to it by the legislature.
8
It has been, and is, the practice of telephone and tele-
graph construction to follow, in so far as possible, the lines
of streets and highways, as affording facilities otherwise not
obtainable. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss
the mooted question of compensation to the abutting owner,
but rather the legal necessity of legislative sanction to enable
these electrical companies to pursue this course. Jackson, J.,
says :9 "It is well settled that the right to use the streets and
other public thoroughfares of a city for the purpose of
placing therein or thereon pipes, mains, wires and poles for
the distribution of gas, water or electric lights, for public
or private use, is not an ordinary business in which any one
may engage, but is a franchise belonging to the government,
the privilege of exercising which can only be granted by the
state or by the municipal government of the city acting
under legislative authority." This view has led to two
very interesting lines of decisions. In the one, it is con-
tended that the legislature stands simply as trustee for the
easement of the public in the highway and, as trustee, takes
no greater title than is necessary to the proper execution of
the trust. Hence it possesses no power to grant franchises
to telegraph and telephone companies for the erection and
maintenance of poles and wires upon the highways and,
though it is tacitly admitted that the granting of franchises
to such companies is a proper exercise of legislative author-
ity, the existence of such poles and wires upon the public
streets is held to be contingent upon a grant from the abut-
ting owner in whom the fee remains.10 In the second line
'Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. i; West River Bridge v. Dix et al., 6
How. 5o7; Shorter v. Smith, 9 Ga. 529; New Hampshire Bridge et aL,
7 N. H. 35; Cal. Teleg. Co. v. Atl. Teleg. Co., 22 Cal. 398; Hazen v.
Union Bank, I Sneed (Tenn.), i15.
' Waterworks v. At1. City, 39 N. J. Eq. 367; Grd. Rpds. E. L. & P. Co.
i'. Grd. Rpds. Edison E. L. & F. G. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 659.
•Grd. Rpds., etc., Co. v. Grd. Rpds. Ed., etc., Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 659.
" Mut. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Colwell Lead Co., 67 How. Pr. 365; B. of T.
Tel. Co. v. Barnett, 107 Ill. 5o7; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Williams, 86 Va. 696.
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of decisions, it is held that the construction of such lines,
and their maintenance upon the streets, is a use similar to
that for which the highways were acquired and constitute
no additional foreign burden upon the fee.'1 Hence the
power to erect poles and string wires, provided the public
easement in the highway is in nowise obstructed, is held to
be a privilege conferred upon telephone and telegraph
companies by, and in, the granting of a franchise to them.
As to the construction of franchises granted to telephone
and telegraph companies, there can be no question. Every
grant of a franchise, or in the nature of a franchise, is to
be construed strictly.12 Nelson, J., in the case of Minturn v.
Lame '" says: "It is a well-settled rule of construction of
grants by the legislature to corporations, whether public or
private, that only such powers and rights can be exercised
under them as are clearly comprehended within the words
of the act, or derived therefrom by necessary implication,
regard being had to the objects of the grant. Any ambiguity
or doubt arising out of the terms must be resolved in favor
of the public." Once granted, however, a franchise assumes
the nature of a contract, and the state is bound by the grant
of the rights, so conveyed by the legislature, even though
they be exclusive, provided they are not in conifict with the
constitution.1
4
Whether the grant of a franchise can be resumed, by the
legislature, or its substantial advantages impaired, without
the consent of the grantees, presents still another inter-
esting question, Van Sycle, J.,15 considers the power
of the legislature, so to resume or impair a franchise,
extremely doubtful, and says: "It is in the nature of a con-
tract, and those who procured the passage of the act having
entered upon the development of their scheme and made
large outlays in its promotion, have acquired rights which
' Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75; Boston v. Richardson, 13 Allen, 146;
Atty. Gen. v. Met. R. R., 125 Mass. 5I5.
' U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 738; Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Pet. i68; Prov-
idence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, ii Pet. 42o.
23 How. 436.
1,Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344.
State v. Blake et al., 35 N. J. L. 208.
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must be regarded." A view that, because of a proper and
fitting regard for vested rights, has been very generally
taken.' So it has been held that a subsequent statute inter-
fering with, restricting, or tending to nullify .a previously
granted franchise, or the rights thereunder acquired, is, in
so far as it so interferes, inoperative and void.17 And, while
the legislature is empowered to exercise the police power of
a state, subject to the power of the court to adjudicate the
question as to whether any particular enactment is an inva-
sion of the constitutional rights of the individual, it may not,
under the guise of protecting public interests, interfere with
or restrict private business.'
The primary question, in the granting of franchises to
telephone and telegraph companies by a municipality, is that
concerning the authority of the particular municipal cor-
poration, in question, to make such grants. The question
at issue is, necessarily: Has the legislature expressly, or by
necessary implication, in the granting of the munipical
charter, or by subsequent legislative enactment applicable
to such municipality, delegated to it such portion of the leg-
islative authority as is necessary to the lawful exercise of
such power ?'o If general control over the streets has been
so granted, the municipality clearly may grant franchises
for the use of the streets, provided no additional burden is
imposed upon the fee.20  As to the necessary method of
action, Van Vleet, V. C., says :2- "Where no method is
prescribed in which a municipality shall exercise its power,
but it is left free to determine the manner for itself, it may
act either by resolution or by ordinance. One method is
just as effectual in point of law as another." 22 In pursuance
" Planters' Bank v. Sharp., 6 How. 301; People v. Manhattan Co., 9
Wend. 351; Bridge Co. v. Hoboken Co. 2 Beas. 81.
' Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; State Bank of Ohio
v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Farrington v. Tenn., 95 U. S. 679; Fletcher v.
Peck., 6 Cranch. 135; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 33.
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 137; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623.
12 Dillon Mun. Corp., par. 68o.
2 Pelton v. E. Clev. Ry. Co., 22 Week. L. Bul. 67.
" Halsey v. R. T. St. Ry. Co., 2o Atl. Rep., 859.
State v. Jersey City, 27 N. J. L. 493; Burlington v. Dennison, 42
N. J. L. 165; Butler v. Passaic, 44 N. J. L. i7I.
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of such delegated authority, a municipality may grant a
franchise that shall be in its nature exclusive, conveying
thereunder rights that the city. may not subsequently impair
nor restrict.2 3  Nevertheless, the franchise so granted
acquires simply the nature of a contract, and if the telephone
or telegraph company erects its poles and wires under
authority of an ordinance, which provides for the expiration
of its privileges on and after a certain date, such company
is possessed of no legal right to maintain such equipment,
within the corporate limits, after the life of such grant.24
So the passage of an ordinance by a municipality, permitting
the erection of poles and wires by a telegraph company on
conditions of benefit to the city, the acceptance of the ordi-
nance by such company, and the subsequent enjoyment of
the benefits by the municipality, constitute all the necessary
essentials of an executed contract which the city may not
violate.
25
Telephone and telegraph companies are, however, prop-
erly subject to municipal regulation, irrespective of the
authority granting the franchises under which they operate.
The imposition of suitable conditions, regulations and restric-
tions, in the form of municipal ordinances, are to be sup-
ported as a proper exercise of the police power of a city,
provided they do not evidence a desire to oppress, or unwar-
rantably control the maintenance and operation of telephone
and telegraph lines within the city.28 So an ordinance requir-
ing such electrical companies to place their wires in conduits
is a proper exercise of municipal police power ;27 likewise a
charge, in the nature of a rental, for the exclusive use of
parts of the streets ;28 and a city may lawfully impose a tax
upon the poles and wires of telephone, or telegraph com-
panies, maintained within the corporate limits, to cover the
Teachout v. Des Moines B. G. R. R. Co., 75 Iowa, 722.
"Mut. Un. Tel. v. Chicago, i6 Fed. Rep. 3o9; So. Bel. Telep. Co. v.
Richmond, 98 Fed. Rep. 671.
' St. Louis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 68; New Orleans v. So. T.
& T. Co., 4o La Ann. 41; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 5o; Kentucky v.
Corrigan, 86 Mo. 67.
Richmond v. So. Bell. Telep. Co., 174 U. S. 761.
" W. U. Tel. Co. v. Mayor, 38 Fed. Rep. 552.
St. Louis v. W. U. Tel. Co., i4) U. S. 465.
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expense to which the municipality is subjected, in the
enforcement of its police regulations, because of the mainte-
nance of such equipment upon the streets of the city;29 but
such tax must be fair and reasonable, and a municipality, in
the exercise of its police power, may not impose exorbitant
charges, nor seek to derive, from such taxation, revenue,
vastly disproportionate to the actual outlay for supervising
and inspecting such poles and wires.30  Indeed, the whole
question of the proper municipal regulation of these, and kin-
dred, electrical companies is one of the greatest nicety. On
the one hand, we have arrayed the inviolability of existing
rights, possessing all the attributes of the consideration of an
executed contract, together with the natural desire to pro-
mote and facilitate the operations of creatures that so largely
tend to improve and widen the scope of business enterprise
and social comfort; on the other hand, the necessity for a
fitting regard for the safety of the community and for the
proper preservation of the rights of its individual members.
The powers of Congress, as to the franchises of telephone
and telegraph companies, are those conveyed by the Federal
Constitution. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which
confers upon Congress the power to regulate interstate com-
merce, permits the states to regulate matters of local interest
which affect, only incidentally, commerce between the states,
but the authority of Congress is universal and exclusive
where the matter is characteristically national. If Congress
fails to act and provides no law for the regulation of com-
merce between the states, of that nature which makes con-
gressional jurisdiction exclusive, it thereby indicates its
desire that such commerce shall not be the subject of state
regulation.31 So a state will not be permitted to restrict, or
impose burdens upon the transmission of messages, by tele-
phone or telegraph companies, from one state to another.
32
Nevertheless, such companies owe obedience to the laws of
Phila. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 32 C. C. A. (Pa.) 246.
' Phila. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 8i Fed. Rep. 948.
*Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa., 114
U. S. i96; Walling v. Mich., 1i6 U. S. 446; Pickard v. Pullman So. Car
Co., 117 U. S. 34.
*'Ry. Co. v. Ill., rI8 U. S. 557.
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the state within which they are located and are under obliga-
tion to pay their fair share of the taxes necessary for its
support, 33 when levied upon their real or personal property
within the jurisdiction of the state.3 4 Telegraphic and tele-
phonic communication between the states :is paft of their
commercial intercourse and so properly subject to the control
of Congress,3 5 and state franchises granted to such com-
panies as operate interstate lines are subject to congres-
sional control, in so far as it may be necessary to control
them for the regulation of commerce.3 6
Acting upon these premises, Congress, July 24, i866,
passed what is known commonly as the "Telegraph Act."
It may be stated, at the outset, that there can be no doubt
that telephone, as well as telegraph, companies are included
within the provisions of this legislation.37  The first para-
graph of the act, which alone is of importance in this discus-
sion, provides that telegraph companies, organized under the
laws of any state, may construct, maintain and operate their
lines over any part of the public domain, military or post
roads, and under or across any navigable streams of the
United States, provided they do not interfere with ordinary
travel, or in any way obstruct the same.33 The court, in the
case of the Pensacola Tel. Co. v. West. Union Tel. Co.,39
defining the powers acquired under the act, says: "It gives
no foreign corporation the right to enter upon private prop-
erty, without the consent of the owner, and erect the neces-
sary structures for its business; but it does provide that,
whenever the consent of the owner is obtained, no state leg-
islation shall prevent the occupation of the post roads for
telegraph purposes by such corporations as are willing to
avail themselves of its privileges." So a telegraph company
may not, relying upon this act, occupy the streets of a city
' Teleg. Co. v. Mass., 125 Mass. 548.
" W. U. Tel. Co. v. Ala., 132 U. S. 472; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Charleston,
163 U. S. 71I.
W. U. Tel. Co. v. AUt., etc., Co., 5 Nev. Io3.
' Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 205.
' Cumb. T. & T. Co. v. Un. El. Ry., 42 Fed. Rep. 273; Wis. Tel. Co. v.
Oshkosh, 62 Wis. 32; C. & P. Tel. Co. v. B. & 0. Tel. Co., 62 Ind. 410.
'Rev. Stats. U. S., par. 5263.
"56 U. S. i.
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without compensation ° and, although all railroads are post
roads,41 a telegraph company is given no right to occupy the
right of way of a railroad, with its lines, without the consent
of the railroad company.42 On the other hand, the railroad
company may not make an exclusive contract of this nature
3
and a telegraph company may acquire right of way over a
railroad, without the consent of the latter, by due process
of law.
44
The question of state taxation of companies accepting the
benefits of the Act of i866 has given rise to a multitude of
decisions. There can be no doubt as to the right of the state
to impose taxes upon business carried on wholly within its
jurisdiction,45 but a specific tax upon each message trans-
mitted beyond the state is unconstitutional, 46 and a tax upon
the franchise of such a company is void ;47 nor may a state
impose a tax upon messages partly within the state.48
Strong, J., in the case of the Railroad v. Penniston49 dis-
cussing the question of state taxation of federal agencies,
says: "It is, therefore, manifest that the exemption of fed-
eral agencies from taxation is dependent, not upon the nature
of the agent or upon the mode of their constitution, or upon
the fact that they are agents, but upon the effect of the tax;
that is, upon the question whether the tax does in truth
deprive them of power to serve the government as they were
intended to serve it, or does it hinder the efficient exercise of
their power." An opinion that states clearly and briefly
the true rule by which state taxation of companies operating
under the "Telegraph Act," must be measured.
'oSt. Louis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92.
Rev. Stats. U. S., Sec. 3964.
"W. U. Tel. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. R. Co., go Fed. Rep. 379.
' W. U. Tel. Co. v. B. & 0. Tel. Co., i Fed. Rep. 66o; Postal Teleg.
Co. v. W. U. Teleg. Co., 5o Fed. Rep. 493.
"Mercantile Trust Co. v. A. & P. Ry. Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 513; Postal
Tel. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 89 Fed. Rep. I9o; Postal Tel. Co. v. Clev.
Ry. Co., 94 Fed. Rep. 234.
' Ratterman v. W. U. Tel. Co., 127 U. S. 411.
4 Teleg. Co. v. Tex., io5 U. S. 46D.
I San Francisco v. W. U. Tel. Co., 31 Pac. Rep. io.
'In re Penn. Tel. Co. (N. J.), 20 Atl. Rep. 846.
o 58 Wall. 5.
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Telegraph companies enjoying the privileges of the Act
of July 24, 1866, do so, in subordination to the due exercise
of the police power of the state in which their lines are situ-
ated ;5o the rights so given are permissive only and properly
subject to all state and local legislation regulating their exer-
cise. So a municipality, under the exercise 6f its police
power, may enact and enforce ordinances intended to pro-
mote the safety and convenience of the public in its use of the
streets ;51 but where such regulations and restrictions are
excessive, or evidence a desire to oppress, control or defeat
the company's existence, they are void. 2 It is not the inten-
tion of the act of July 24, 1866, to do more than, exercise a
proper control of a business, whose very nature makes its
operations interstate commerce, but neither state nor munici-
pality may enact laws that hinder the exercise of the powers,
the enjoyment of the privileges Congress has so conferred
upon electrical companies of this nature. Nevertheless, a
proper interpretation of the law demands that telephone and
telegraph companies, operating under the act, be subject to
legislation that is simply the due exercise of the police powers
of the state or municipality.
G. C. Hamilton, LL. B.
"Richmond v. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 U. S. 76r.
Mich. Tel. Co. v. Charlotte, 93 Fed. Rep. ii.t 2Richmond v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., I74 U. S. 761.
